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THE IMPACT OF CHINA AND
INDIA ON THE DEVELOPING
WORLD
RAPHAEL KAPLINSKY*
The global economy is undergoing a profoundand momentous shift. The first half of the 21st
century will undoubtedly be dominated by the con-
sequences of a new Asian dynamism. China is likely
to become the second biggest economy in the world
by 2016, and India the third largest by 2035. A clus-
ter of other countries in the Asian region, such as
Thailand and Vietnam, are also growing rapidly.
These newly dynamic Asian economies can collec-
tively be characterised as the “Asian Drivers of
Global Change”. The economic processes they
engender are likely to radically transform regional
and global economic, political and social interactions
and to have a major impact on the environment.This
is a critical “disruption” to the global economic and
political order that has held sway for the past five
decades. It is reshaping the world as we know it,
heralding a new “Global-Asian” era.
Role of China and India for global change
As mentioned above, the two key Asian Driver
economies are China and India. But they reflect very
different growth paths. China is integrated into an
outward-oriented regional economy, involving fine
divisions of labour in many sectors. By contrast (at
least until now) India represents much more of a
“standalone” economic system. Yet, notwithstanding
these differences in structure, they pose major and
distinct challenges for the global and developing
economies, for six major reasons.
The first is as a consequence of their size.As Figure 1
shows, from the beginning of their growth spurts
(1979 and 1992, respectively), neither GDP or export
growth in the two largest Asian Driver economies
were unique. In recent years other Asian economies
(for example, Japan and Korea) have experienced
similarly rapid growth paths. However, whilst China
accounted for 20 percent of the world’s population
and India for 17 percent in 2002, at no time did the
combined population of Japan and Korea’s exceed
four percent of the global total (Figure 2). So, unlike
the case of Korea and Japan who could grow without
severe disruption to the global economy, we have to
suspend the “small-country” assumption in the case
of the Asian Drivers. The very high trade intensity of
China’s growth makes the big-country effect partic-
ularly prominent in its case. Between 1985 and 2005,
China’s exports rose from $50 billion to $772 billion,
transforming China into the world’s third largest
trading nation.
Second, China (especially) and India embody
markedly different combinations of state and capi-
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talist development compared with the industrialised
world. Chinese enterprises have their roots in state
ownership, usually arising from very large and often
regionally-based firms (Nolan 2005; Shankar 2005).
They reflect a complex and dynamic amalgam of
property rights – “The ownership of each of China’s
large SOEs [state owned enterprises] has spread
gradually among a variety of public institutions, each
of which has an interest in the firm’s performance …
[b]ased on the “ownership maze” and vaguely de-
fined property rights” (Nolan 2005, 169). With access
to cheap (and often subsidised) long-term capital,
these firms operate with distinctive time-horizons
and are less risk-averse than their western counter-
parts (Tull 2006). Indian firms are probably less dis-
tinct from the western model, although they tend to
be less specialised and often include elements of
social commitment which are largely alien to west-
ern firms (Humphrey, Kaplinsky and Saraph 1998).
Associated with these complex forms of ownership
and links to regional and central state bodies,
Chinese firms often operate abroad as a component
of a broader strategic thrust. This is particularly
prominent in China’s advance in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) in its search for the energy and commodities
required to fuel its industrial advance (Kaplinsky,
McCormick and Morris 2006).
The third reason why the Asian Drivers present a
new and significant challenge to the global and
developing economies is that they combine low
incomes and low wages with significant innovative
potential. This means that they are able to compete
across the range of factor prices. The oft-stated
belief (and hope?) that China will run out of
unskilled labour is belied by the size of its reserve
army of unemployed, estimated
at around 150 million compared
to the 83 million people em-
ployed in formal sector manu-
facturing in 2002 (Kaplinsky
2005). As Shenkar observes,
“China’s enormous labor re-
serves, with pay scales radically
lower in the hinterland than the
coast and in urban areas (the
average income on the farm,
where more than half of the
Chinese population lives, is less
than $25 per month), creates
the equivalent of a country
within a country; so, instead of
Vietnam or Bangladesh replac-
ing China as a labour-intensive haven, Hunan will
replace Guangdong” (Shenkar 2005, 134). More-
over by 2030, India, also with a large reserve army
of underemployed, is likely to have a larger popu-
lation than China. But China and India are not
content to operate in this world of cheap labour
and mature technologies, and are investing heavily
in the building of technological capabilities. China,
for example, overtook Japan to become the world’s
second largest investor in R&D in 2006.
Fourth, China and India are associated with very dif-
ferent forms of regional integration. China is part of
a distributed regional network of production, reflect-
ing wider regional competitiveness. Traded goods
‘manufactured in China’ usually emanate from re-
gional production systems – China’s trade deficit
with East Asia grew from $4 billion in 1990 to
$40 billion in 2002, and the region’s share of China’s
merchandise imports grew from 55 to 62 percent in
the same period (Lall and Abaladejo 2004). An
increasing proportion of China’s trade involves the
processing of imported raw materials and intermedi-
ates (widely referred to in the literature as “verti-
calised trade”, see Feenstra 1998). Official data show
that this form of trade grew to $404.8 billion in 2003
(48 percent of the total trade volume), up from
$2.5 billion in 1981 (5.7 percent of total trade)
(NiHaoOuZhou_com 2006). By contrast, Indian
exports are more an outcome of a “national system
of production”, so that the spread effects of the
growth paths of these two Asian Driver economies
are likely to be very different.
Fifth, both China and India are now heavily engaged
in global institutions, but whereas India has long
been a participant, China’s global presence is more
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recent. Whilst the nature of their political engage-
ments with the rest of the world differs sharply, they
increasingly affect global and regional governance
(Humphrey and Messner 2006). India plays a major
role as an “advocate” of the interests of the develop-
ing countries, for example as the leader of G22 with-
in the WTO. China is pushing the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (formed by China,
Russia, Kazakstan, Kirgistan, Tadjikistan and
Uzbekistan) as a significant player in the area of
global energy policies. China and India also provide
a different policy role-model for many developing
economies, with the possible rise of a “Beijing
Consensus” to rival the Washington Consensus.
These dynamics represent a transition from a quasi-
unilateral US-dominated world order to a multipolar
power constellation. This could lead to new turbu-
lences and conflicts between the rising and the
declining powers within the global governance sys-
tem (Humphrey and Messner 2006).
Finally, China and India have huge and rapidly-
growing energy needs. China is already the second
largest emitter of greenhouse gases (only exceeded
by the US) and by 2015 its energy demand is expect-
ed to roughly double, and India’s to rise by 50 per-
cent. The world’s biocapacity will be severely
stretched if it is to feed China’s and India’s resource
hunger and sustain their growth.
The impact on low income economies: Key issues
Thus, the Asian Drivers are clearly likely to have a
major impact on the global economic, political,
social and environmental economy. But it is only
relatively recently that their impact on low income
economies has been specifically problematised.
Here we can identify five distinct development-
related questions
1. What are the consequences of the emergence of
the Asian Drivers for economic growth in other
developing economies and regions?
2. Who are likely to be the losers and winners from
the growing dynamism of the Asian Drivers, with-
in and between low-income economies and
regions? 
3. How should developing countries engage with
the global economy in general and the Asian
Drivers in particular?
4. What effect will the shift in global power in insti-
tutions of regional and global governance and in
private and non-governmental organisations
have on developing countries?
5. Given the enormous resource and energy hunger
of the Asian Drivers, what are the environmental
consequences for other developing countries?
Assessing the impact of the Asian driver economies
on the developing word
How might we assess these impacts? We can distin-
guish three sets of structuring principles to aid this
analysis – the channels of Asian Driver interaction
with the global economy; the distinction between
complementary and competitive impacts; and the
difference between direct and indirect impacts.
Channels of interaction
There are a variety of different channels through
which individual countries interact with other
economies, in their regions and elsewhere. Clearly,
these channels are contingent – they change over
time, and vary in importance depending on factors
such as location, resource endowment, trade links,
and geo-strategic significance. Six key channels stand
out in importance.
The first of these are the trade links between the
Asian Drivers and the global economy. China’s share
of global merchandise trade had risen to 6.7 percent
by 2004, exceeding that of Japan, and growing par-
ticularly rapidly from the mid-1990s, a period in
which the US’s share of merchandise trade fell
appreciably (Table 1). By 2004, China’s share of
global manufacturing exports had risen to 8.3 per-
cent, still below that of the US and Germany but
growing rapidly. By contrast, India’s share of global
merchandise trade was basically stable in the same
period, at a much lower level than China’s. However,
India’s share of global service trade, particularly IT
services grew (although no clear comparative data
are available).
The second major channel of interaction is FDI.
Already the Asian Drivers account for the major
share of global inward FDI, with China and Hong
Kong alone attracting almost 40 percent of total FDI
destined for developing countries (UNCTAD 2005).
But the Asian Drivers are increasingly also a source
of outward FDI. In some regions – SSA in particular
(Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris 2006) – China
has become the major source of new inward FDI,
particularly in economies which because of their
political fragility, have been shunned by western
investors for some years. There are four primary
types of FDI – technology-leveraging, resource-
seeking, market-seeking and cost-reducing. Chinese
outward investment clearly fits into the first three of
these – technology leveraging investments in the US
(and, to a lesser extent, the EU), and resource-seek-
ing and market-seeking investments predominantly
in other developing economies.
The third channel is finance. Large trade surpluses in
both China and India coupled with these countries’
ability to attract FDI and other categories of capital
flows have led to a build-up of large foreign reserves,
estimated at more than $1 trillion in 2006. A signifi-
cant change in how Asia’s capital surpluses are man-
aged could cause an abrupt adjustment in the US
interest rates and the dollar and thereby destabilise
the entire world economy. It could also accelerate a
slow-moving structural change which is the gradual
weakening of the role of the dollar as the world’s
main reserve currency. Both of these developments
have significant indirect implications for other devel-
oping countries, affecting the structure of global
financial markets and the competitiveness of their
exchange rates.
The fourth channel of interaction arises in relation to
institutions of global and regional governance. The
emerging strategies of China and India towards the
multilateral institutions such as WTO, UN, World
Bank and IMF, and the global climate regime and
the bilateral interactions between the US, Europe
and the Asian Drivers will profoundly change the
international context for other developing countries
(Chan 2006; Messner 2006). This could create new
options for developing countries
if China and India were to play
the role of “voices of the South”
in global politics. However, if
they look primarily to their own
interests, new conflicts between
the Asian Drivers and other
developing countries might
arise. China’s close cooperation
with “difficult states” like Sudan,
Myanmar, Uzbekistan, and
Zimbabwe and its close energy
partnership with Iran provoke
tensions with western countries
and demonstrate that the Asian
Drivers are able to alter geo-
strategic maps and north–south relationships
(Humphrey and Messner 2006).
Migration from the Asian Drivers and interactions
with diaspora communities represents a fifth chan-
nel of impact. To some extent, migration is already
a “fact” of considerable importance with large
Chinese and Indian diasporas in Asia. Outward
migration from India to SSA occurred during the
late 19th century and first half of the twentieth
century, and in the latter twentieth century extend-
ed to Europe, North America and Australasia. But
more recently, Asian Driver migration has risen,
particularly from China to SSA. For example, by
some counts, there are currently more than
200,000 Chinese living in South Africa, who are
mostly recent migrants. The Chinese population of
Lusaka grew from 3,000 to more than 30,000
between 1995 and 2005 and Chinese migrant com-
munities are increasingly prominent in many
African countries, including from poor regions in
China.
The sixth and final major channel of impact on
other economies arises from environmental spill-
overs. Rapid growth in China and India consumes
natural resources and generates cross–border envi-
ronmental damages within the Asian region.
Problems with the use of natural resources are
widely documented. For example, there have been
repeated denunciations of the activities of illegal
Chinese timber logging companies in Myanmar. It
is estimated that between one third and one half of
acid rain in South Korea and Japan is the result of
sulphur dioxide emissions from China (Umbach
2005). Beyond that, China’s and India’s rapidly ris-
ing imports of natural resources from all over the
world are creating environmental problems in
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Table 1 
World merchandise trade by region and selected economy  
(% share of total)
1948 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2004 
United 
States  21.7 18.8 14.9 12.3 11.2 12.7 9.9 9.2 
Europe      31.5 34.9 41.4 45.4 43.5 45.4 46.1 45.3 
Japan  0.4 1.5 3.5 6.4 8.0 9.9 6.4 6.4 
S. and C. 
America 11.4 9.8 6.3 4.3 4.4 3.0 2.9 3.1 
Africa  7.3 6.5 5.7 4.8 4.5 2.5 2.4 2.6 
Asia  13.6 13.1 12.4 14.9 19.1 26.1 26.1 26.8 
 China  0.9 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.2 2.5 6.0 6.7 
 India  2.2 1.3 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 
Source: Kaplinsky and Messner (2007). 
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Africa, Latin America and the rest of Asia. The
most important global environmental impact of
rapid growth in the two Asian giant economies will
be their contribution to global climate change.
China’s share of worldwide CO2 emissions could
reach 25 percent in 2025, the corresponding figure
for India being 10 to 15 percent.
Complementary and competitive impacts
Simplistically, and as a starting point, the interac-
tions between the Asian Drivers, the global econo-
my and individual regions and countries can be
seen in a binary framework as comprising a range
of complementary or competitive impacts. Table 2
provides some examples, notional, but informed by
the emerging nature of Asian Driver expansion. In
each of these channels of interaction, we can
observe a mix of complementary and competitive
impacts. For example, with regard to trade, the
Asian Drivers may both provide cheap inputs and
consumer goods, and be a market for the exports
from other developing countries. On the other
hand, imports from the Asian Drivers can readily
displace local producers. In relation to FDI, the
Asian Drivers may either be a direct source of
inward FDI or crowd-in FDI from third countries
as parts of extended global value chains. But the
Asian Drivers may also compete with other
economies for global FDI. The rising power of the
Asian Drivers in a western dominated global gov-
ernance system may strengthen the voice of devel-
oping countries in international organizations. The
emerging conflicts between the Asian Drivers, the
US and Europe on energy, resources and markets
might also marginalize development policy issues in
word politics. Similarly, financial flows, environ-
mental spill-overs and migration may be either
complementary or competitive.
The key element of these interactions is the “for
whom” component. Countries may be affected dif-
ferentially – in some cases, for example, the export of
fabrics from the Asian Drivers may feed productive-
ly into a vibrant clothing and textile value chain; in
other cases, it may displace a country’s exports and
production for the domestic market. But these
effects are not just felt at the national and economy-
wide level. They affect groups within countries dif-
ferentially. For example, cheap clothing imports from
China may displace clothing and textile workers, but
cheapen wage goods and hence reduce wage costs
for producers in other sectors, which is indeed what
has been occurring in many high-income economies
during the early years of the 21st century. These
impacts on a complementary-competitive axis may
also change over time, and most importantly, they
will vary for different classes, regions and groups
within economies.
Direct and indirect impacts
The complementary-competitive axis of impacts is
readily comprehended and widely recognised. Less
widely acknowledged is the distinction between
direct and indirect impacts. In part this is because
the indirect impacts are difficult to measure.
However, in many cases, the indirect impacts may in
Table 2 
Examples of complementary and competitive impacts 
Channels Impact Nature of links
Complementary
Imports of cheap consumer goods from Asian Drivers; 
Exports of commodities to Asian Drivers
Trade Competitive Imports from Asian Drivers displace local producers
Complementary Inflows of FDI from Asian DriversFDI
Competitive Competition for US FDI from Asian Drivers
Complementary Loans from Asian Drivers to governments and private actorsFinance
Competitive Low-cost finance from Asian Drivers displaces local 
financial intermediaries
Complementary Support for Development Round from Asian Drivers in 
WTO
Global Governance
Competitive Asian Drivers side with EU in WTO
Complementary Asian Driver migrants intermediate complementary trade 
with home countries
Migration
Competitive Asian Driver migrants displace local entrepreneurs
Complementary Asian Drivers cooperate in regional  water projectsEnvironment
Competitive Asian Drivers as significant motors of global climate change
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
fact be much more significant than the direct ones.
Table 3 gives some examples, for purposes of illus-
tration contrasting direct complementary impacts
with indirect competitive impacts in Lesotho, a poor
SSA economy. In 2000 to 2004 Lesotho’s clothing
exports to the US under the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA) scheme grew very rapid-
ly, but were undermined in 2005 to 2006 by Chinese
competition following the removal of MFA quotas
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2006). Looking at the trade
channel, thus, direct complementary impacts includ-
ed the supply of fabrics used in Lesotho’s clothing
exports. On the other hand, the indirect impact on
Lesotho of China’s growing competitiveness in the
US led to a 17 percent fall in exports during 2005.
Whilst some of these exports arose from Taiwanese-
owned plants, in other cases potential foreign
investors in Lesotho preferred to manufacture
clothes in China (as well as India and Bangladesh).
Lesotho suffered badly from the appreciation of the
rand (to which its currency was tied), an indirect
impact of Southern Africa’s burgeoning commodity
exports to China. Lesotho also stands to lose from
China’s accession to the WTO and the power it
might wield in removing preferential access to
major markets for the exports of least developed
countries, outweighing any possible positive impact
of potential budgetary aid to government. Finally,
Lesotho’s major export other than clothing (vulner-
able to Asian Driver competition) and unskilled
migrant labour is its water. A change in rainfall pat-
terns consequent on global warming is likely to have
very adverse economic impacts.
As in the case of the complementary/competitive
access, the impact of the direct and indirect
impacts can be gauged either at the country level,
or at intra-national levels, for example with
regard to different regions, sectors, classes and
genders.
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Table 3 
Examples of direct complementary and indirect competitive impacts on Lesotho 
Channels Impact Direct Indirect
Complementary
Asian Driver fabrics used in 
Lesotho’s clothing exports
Trade
Competitive
Asian Driver competition in US 
squeezes out Lesotho clothing 
exports
Complementary Asian Driver investment in 
Lesotho’s clothing sector
FDI
Competitive
US foreign investors relocate 
clothing factories from Lesotho 
to China
Complementary Asian Driver aid for budgetary 
support 
Finance
Competitive
Asian Driver led realignment of 
currencies forces up the value of 
the rand, and undermines 
profitability of Lesotho’s 
clothing exports
Complementary
Budgetary support to 
government augments state 
power
Global 
Governance
Competitive
Asian Driver input into WTO 
removes AGOA preferences
Complementary
Chinese migrants facilitate 
imports of cheap consumer 
goodsMigration
Competitive Chinese migrants squeeze out 
local traders
Complementary
Indian solar technologies 
enhance energy efficiency in 
rural areasEnvironment
Competitive
Asian Driver carbon emissions 
lead to global warming and 
reduce rainfall in SSA
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
CESifo Forum 1/200721
Focus
Conclusion: There is much that we don’t know
The rapidity of the rise of the Asian Driver econo-
mies means that we are only beginning to recognise
the enormity of their likely impact on the world
economy in general, and low income economies in
particular. We know that this impact is likely to be
large. We also know that this impact can be transmit-
ted through a variety of channels, and have identified
six of the more important channels. We also know
that these impacts might have a combination of com-
plementary and competitive impacts. In general,
actors in low income economies tend to see more
opportunities and complementary synergies with the
rise of the Asian Drivers. By contrast, observers in
the high-income countries (particularly those focus-
ing on low income economies) tend to be more
aware of competitive impacts. And, finally we also
know that these impacts may be direct and indirect.
In general, most attention is placed on the direct
impacts, since these are more visible through bilater-
al relations. But the indirect impacts may often be
more important, and much more difficult to unravel.
These pockets of information are just that – pockets.
There is an enormous and urgent task ahead of doc-
umenting these emerging impacts, distinguishing
between different types of economies and regions,
and different communities within these countries
and regions. Unless these trends and subtleties are
adequately understood, it will be very difficult for
low income countries to maximise the opportunities
and minimise the threats arising from the rise of the
Asian Drivers.
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